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Resumen
La administración del Presidente George W. 
Bush intento crear varios campos de tortura y 
detención sin limitaciones legales con el propósito 
de interrogar y detener a individuos sospechosos 
de cometer actos de terrorismo luego de los 
ataques de Septiembre 11. La administración 
del Presidente Bush selecciono los campos 
localizados en la bahía de Guantánamo, Cuba, 
en gran medida por que este territorio había sido 
designado un territorio no-incorporado que le 
permitiera construir un campo de detención fuera 
del alcance de la ley. Este articulo demuestra que 
los fundamentos legales utilizados para justificar 
la creación de los campos en Guantánamo 
son parte de una larga tradición de anexión 
territorial que ha durado mas de cien años y que 
fue desarrollada para justificar los esfuerzos de 
Estados Unidos por egresar el club internacional 
de Imperios. Además, este articulo sugiere que la 
noción del totalitarianismo invertido de Sheldon 
S. Wolin describe de mejor manera los debates 
legales que se han desatado sobre el estatus 
constitucional de los campamentos en la bahía de 
Guantánamo, Cuba en los ultimos años.
Palabras clave: Guantánamo, territorios 
no-incorporados, estado de excepción, 
totalitarismo invertido.
AbstRAct
Following the attacks of September 11, the 
administration of President George W. Bush sought 
to create new torture and detention camps that 
could be used to interrogate and hold suspected 
terrorists without the limitations imposed by the 
rule of law. The Bush administration selected 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba in large measure due to 
its unincorporated territorial status, a status that 
enabled the administration to claim that the law 
did not apply to this location. This article argues 
that the legal basis for the creation of these camps 
has been part of a longstanding territorial tradition 
developed by the United States to legitimate its 
efforts to join a club of global Empires. The article 
further suggests that Sheldon S. Wolin’s notion of 
inverted totalitarianism best describes the ensuing 
legal debates over the constitutional status of 
the United States torture and detention camps 
situated in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
Key words: Guantánamo, Unincorporated 
Terr i tory, State of Except ion, Inverted 
Totalitarianism.
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Inverted totalItarIanIsm, camPs, and the unIted states 
terrItorIal doctrIne
That is the current and constitutional meaning 
of the nice formula “colonies are foreign in public law, 
but domestic in international law”.
Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy 1
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush sought to create torture and interrogation camps where suspected terrorists could be held outside of the reach 
of the rule of law. By early 2002, the Bush administration had agreed to use 
the United States Naval base located in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba as a staging 
point for the creation of detention facilities such as the infamous Camp 
X-Ray2. Journalists like Jane Mayer suggested that the “notion” of “secretly 
holding terror suspects itself outside of the reach of any law was a new one, 
forged in the frantic weeks immediately after September 11”3. Critics like 
Giorgio Agamben argued that the Bush Administration had sought to create 
camps that could be placed in a “state of exception” located outside of the 
reach of the law and ruled by pure violence4. By 2004, the Supreme Court 
had begun ruling on various dimensions of the legality of the Guantánamo 
Bay camps in cases like Rasul v. Bush (2004)5 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
 this research. I am thankful for the support and encouragement of Peter Fitzpatrick, Farid 
Samir-Benavides, Alex Betancourt Mark Boyer, and Guillermo Irizarry. Department of Political 
Science. Institute for Puerto Rican & Latino Studies. University of Connecticut. E-mail:charles.
venator@uconn.edu
1 Schmitt, Carl. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Trans. Ellen Kennedy, Cambridge, The 
MIT Press, 1988, p. 10.
2  Cole, David. Enemy Aliens, Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on 
Terrorism, New York, The New Press, 2003; and Margulies, Joseph. Guantánamo and the 
Abuse of Presidential Power, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2006.
3  Mayer, Jane. The Dark Side, The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War 
on American Ideals, New York, Doubleday, 2008, p. 146.
4  Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception, Trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 2005.
5  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).

















(2006)6. However, it would not be until 2008 when the Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of the camps in Boumediene v. Bush 7, where a majority of 
justices (5-4) citing the precedents established by the Insular Cases began 
to temper the Bush administration’s efforts to run camps “outside” of the 
rule of law by recognizing the extension of the writ of habeas corpus to the 
detainees8. In it’s last major opinion on the subject, the Supreme Court had 
both affirmed the relevance of a century-old set of precedents and tempered 
the efforts by the Bush administration to create a “legal black-holes” without 
questioning the legality of the camps themselves.
In this article, I argue that the legal basis for the United States (U.S.) creation of 
torture and detention camps is not new, but is rather based on a century-old 
set of precedents established by the Insular Cases beginning in 19019. I also 
argue that while the Bush administration may have sought to create “state of 
exception” to detain suspected terrorists, the Supreme Court’s intervention 
in Boumediene is rather reminiscent of what Sheldon S. Wolin has described 
as a form of “inverted totalitarianism”10. This article begins by explaining and 
contextualizing the origins of the Insular Cases and its relationship to U.S. 
territorial expansionism. I argue that the ensuing precedents, precedents that 
guide the continued reliance on camps located in Guantánamo Bay, were 
originally developed to govern non-white populations and to affirm a form 
of U.S. global Empire. This discussion is followed by a brief discussion of the 
ways in which Agamben and Wolin’s theories can help us understand the use 
of camps to enforce various forms of legal violence11. I conclude the article 
6  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
7  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
8  For a useful summary of this legal history, see Dorf, Michael C., “What’s at Stake in the Latest 
Guantánamo Bay Case?”, en Findlaw.com, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20071205.
html (16.02.2009).
9  For an alternative interpretation of the role of the Insular Cases see generally Rivera Ramos, 
Efrén. American Colonialism in Puerto Rico: The Judicial and Social Legacy, Princeton: 
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007; Torruella, Juan R. The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico, 
The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal, Río Piedras: Ed. de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
1988; Duffy Burnett, Christina and Burke Marshall, eds. Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto 
Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001; and 
Sparrow, Bartholomew H. The Insular Cases and the Emergence of the American Empire, 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.
10  Wolin, Sheldon S. Democracy Incorporated, Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted 
Totalitarianism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008.
11  For a more generous interpretation see Neuman, Gerald L. “The Extraterritorial Constitution 
After Boumediene v. Bush”, Southern California Law Review, No. 82 (2009), pp. 259-260; 
and Duffy Burnett, Christina, “A Convenient Constitution? Constitutionality After Boumediene 
v. Bush”, Columbia Law Review, No. 109 (2009), pp. 973-1046.























with an update on the continuities and discontinuities of the use of camps by 
the administration of President Barack H. Obama.
from colonIalIsm to u.s. global emPIre
Since its inception, the United States has developed three legal traditions of 
state-sponsored territorial expansionism with corresponding interpretations 
of the applicability of constitutional rights. The United States simultaneously 
developed a colonialist and an imperialist tradition of territorial expansionism 
throughout the 19th century. However, during the 1890s a group of Republican 
Party members began to develop a new form of territorial expansionism 
premised on the annexation of islands strategically located throughout the 
globe. This new form of global expansionism combined features of both the 
colonialist and imperialist traditions enabling the United States to enter the 
elite club of global Empires.
The state-sponsored tradition of colonialism was premised on the annexation 
of territories that could be settled and subsequently admitted as states of the 
Union12. Since its inception, the United States has annexed and subsequently 
admitted thirty-seven states13. This tradition was also rooted on an interpretation 
of the Territories Clause14 and Statehood Article15 of the Constitution of the 
12  Although it is outside of the scope of this article, it is important to note that the U.S. developed 
both a state-sponsored form of colonialism and a popular-sovereignty form of colonialism. 
The latter form of colonialism was premised on the idea that individual settlers would conquer 
and colonize territories independent of the state. Examples of these non-state sponsored forms 
of colonialism or popular sovereignty initiatives abound including the creation of Mormon 
State of Deseret and Jefferson Territory in the U.S. and around the world (e.g. Isle of Pines, 
Cuba). For an interesting history of popular sovereignty forms of colonialism, see Trinklein, 
Michael J. Lost States, True Stories of Texlahoma, Transylvania, and Other States That Never 
Made It, Philadelphia: Quirk Books, 2010.
13  Congressional Research Service, Admission of States Into the Union After the Original 
Thirteen: A Brief History and Analysis of the Statehood Process, prepared by Peter B. Sheridan, 
Government Division, Congressional Research Service, 85-765 GOV, Washington, D.C., 
1985.
14  U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, §3, cl. 2.
15  U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, §4. For more detailed histories of the admission of new states into 
the Union see generally Farrand, Max. The Legislation of Congress for the Government of 
the Organized Territories of the United States, 1789-1895, Newark: Ed. Wm. A. Baker, 1896; 
Farrand, Max, “Territory and District”, in The American Historical Review, 5, no. 4 1900, 
676-681; Willoughby, William F. Territories and Dependencies of the United States, Their 
Government and Administration, New York: The Century Co., 1905; Grupo de Investigadores 
Puertorriqueños. Breakthrough From Colonialism: An Interdisciplinary Study of Statehood, 
2 vols. Río Piedras: Ed. de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1984; and López Baralt, José. The 
Policy of the United States Towards its Territories with Special Reference to Puerto Rico, Río 
Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1999.

















United States. These constitutional provisions gave Congress a plenary power 
to make all needful rules and regulations in order to govern the colonial 
territories as well as a power to determine when to admit these territories into 
the Union as states on an equal-footing with the original thirteen16.
Throughout the 19th Century the Supreme Court established that colonial 
territories were a constitutional part of the United States, albeit in a temporary 
state of tutelage contingent on its subsequent admission as a state. For example, 
in Loughborough v. Blake (1820) Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Does this term designate the whole, or any particular portion of the 
American empire? Certainly this question can admit but one answer. 
It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of 
States and territories. The District of Columbia, or the territory west 
of the Missouri, is not less within the United States, than Maryland 
or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our 
constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties, and 
excises, should be observe in the one, than in the other (emphasis 
added)17.
While it is true that colonial territories were governed as inferior localities 
within the Federalist arrangement, an arrangement that privileged statehood 
as the epicenter of equal territorial membership in the United States, all 
constitutional provisions not locally inapplicable were operational in these 
territories. More precisely, the Constitution extended to the territories ex propio 
vigore or on its own terms, just like it would extend to any state of the Union 
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
As a result of the territorial status of colonies, the bill of rights extended to 
the colonial territories on its own force and imposed constitutional limitations 
on the powers of Congress. Prior to the enactment of the 14th Amendment, 
the Supreme Court had established that Congressional power could not 
infringe on the individual civil rights of citizens residing in the territories18. For 
example, in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856) the Court invalidated congressional 
legislation prohibiting the extension of slavery to the northern territories on 
account that it violated the individual rights to property of U.S. citizen-settlers19. 
16  Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
17  Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317, at 319 (1820).
18  American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828).
19  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 























Moreover, amidst the U.S. Civil War, Congress began to enact legislation that 
extended equal constitutional rights to the citizens of these territories. Most 
notably, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the precursor to the 
14th Amendment, extending equal protection of the laws to all territories 
within the jurisdiction of the United States20. In addition, by 1878 Congress 
had formally extended all constitutional provisions not locally inapplicable 
to the territories under the terms of the Revised Statutes §199221. This meant 
that individuals residing in the territories would be entitled to the same civil 
rights protections available in the states, including the bill of rights and other 
privileges like the writ of habeas corpus.
The United States also developed alternative imperialist legal policies and 
jurisprudence in order to legitimate the occupation of territories without being 
bound to permanently annex these. Since its inception the United States 
has occupied territories for belligerent or military purposes, for commercial 
exploitation (e.g. Guano Islands), and for expansionist purposes (e.g. Native 
American lands). However, rather than invoking the Territories Clause, a 
provision that could lead to governing occupied territories as a part of the 
Union for constitutional purposes, the United States has invoked alternative 
constitutional provisions such as the Commander-in-Chief Clause (belligerent 
occupation)22 and the Commerce Clause23 to legitimate the indefinite 
occupation of a territorial possession. The invocation of these constitutional 
provisions enabled U.S. lawmakers to create exceptions in how the law 
governs the occupied territories and their respective inhabitants based on 
international or customary principles of law, and approach that has been 
curtailed by the proliferation of international laws and norms throughout the 
20th century.
Throughout the 19th century, the Supreme Court generally ascribed a “foreign” 
constitutional status to occupied territories. This meant that Congress and 
the President, acting in a capacity of Commander-in-Chief, could selectively 
20  Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, Chapter 31, 39th Cong. 1st sess., United States Statutes at 
Large 14 (1866), p. 27.
21  United States Congress, Revised Statutes of the United States, 1873-1874, 43rd Cong., 1st sess. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878, p. 356.
22  U.S. Constitution, Article 2, §2, cl. 1.
23  U.S. Constitution, Article 1, §8, cl. 3. In the case of the occupation of Native American 
territories, United States legal actors have also constantly invoked constitutional provisions 
that exclude “Indians” not subject to Federal taxation laws in order to justify imperialist laws 
and policies.

















determine when and how to treat an occupied territory as a foreign location 
for the purposes of applying Federal law. Perhaps the most important iteration 
of this interpretation was established by the Supreme Court in Fleming v. Page 
(1850), a case addressing the constitutionality of the imposition of tariffs on 
goods imported into the U.S. from the Port of Tampico while it was under 
U.S. occupation24. To be sure writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger B. 
Taney argued:
As regarded by all other nations, it (the port of Tampico, Mexico) was 
a part of the United States, and belong them exclusively as the territory 
included in our established boundaries…. But yet it was not a part 
of this Union. For every nation which acquires territory by treaty or 
conquest holds it according to its own institutions and laws 25. 
In other words, the United States, acting as a belligerent occupying force, 
could exercise a plenary power to include the occupied territory within the 
United States for international purposes, while simultaneously exclude this 
territory for constitutional purposes. Throughout, the Court has employed 
variant versions of this logic to govern other occupied territories. Yet, was is 
important to note is that under the imperialist tradition the occupied territories 
can be selectively governed as foreign localities for the purposes of extending 
the constitution.
The imperialist tradition has treated occupied territories as foreign countries 
for the purposes of extending constitutional rights and protections to the 
inhabitants of these localities. Historically, this has meant that Congress wields 
a power to chose what constitutional provisions it would extend or withhold 
from an occupied territory. The Supreme Court best summarized this logic in 
its ruling on Ross v. McIntyre (1891):
The constitution can have no operation in another country. When, 
therefore, the representatives or officers of our government are permitted 
to exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on 
such conditions as the two countries may agree; the laws of neither 
one being obligatory upon the other. The deck of a private American 
vessel, it is true, is considered for many purposes, constructively as 
territory of the United States; yet persons on board of such vessels, 
24  Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603 (1850).
25  Id., at 615.























whether officers, sailors, or passengers, cannot invoke the protection 
of the provisions referred to until brought within the actual territorial 
boundaries of the United States 26.
In other words, the Constitution, or more precisely the bill of rights does not 
extend ex propio vigore or on its own force to locations situated outside of 
the United States. It is true however that during the 1950s the Court began to 
shift away from this logic as it applied to U.S. citizens, establishing in cases 
like Reid v. Covert (1957) that U.S. citizens subject to criminal proceedings 
are entitled to constitutional protections when being tried outside of the 
United States27. But it is also true that the Court has affirmed in cases like 
U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) that basic constitutional rights like the 4th 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does 
not protect non-U.S. citizens from the arbitrary actions of U.S. officials28. 
Stated differently, Federal officials have been constitutionally empowered 
to detain and prosecute “foreigners” outside of the United States without 
being bound to extend these detainees any substantive constitutional 
protections.
During the 1890s, and more specifically following the Spanish-American 
War of 1898, the United States began to develop a new theory of territorial 
expansionism with a corresponding territorial policy that combined 
features from both the colonialist and imperialist traditions. The new form 
of expansionism drew upon the theories of retired Naval Captain Alfred T. 
Mahan and was premised on the indefinite annexation of strategically located 
islands throughout the globe that could house naval and/or military stations29. 
Proponents of this global form of expansionism envisioned annexing “real 
estate” that could be held in indefinitely without having to admit these into 
the Union new as states. From a constitutional perspective, U.S. legal actors 
invoked an imperialist interpretation of the Territories Clause that would enable 
Congress to selectively govern annexed territories, as foreign or occupied 
localities in a domestic or constitutional sense.
26  Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
27  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
28  U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
29  Mahan, A. T. The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future, Boston, Little, Brown 
and Company, 1898; LaFeber, Walter, “The ‘Lion in the Path’: The U.S. Emergence as a World 
Power”, en Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no. 5, 1986, 705-718; and Rodríguez Beruff, 
Jorge. Strategy as Politics: Puerto Rico on the Eve of the Second World War. Río Piedras, La 
Editorial, 2007. 

















The new theory of global expansionism was premised on the creation of a 
new territorial status selectively located somewhere in-between a foreign 
country and a state of the Union. Advocates of this form of global expansionism 
introduced this theory during the debates over the U.S. annexation of the 
Spanish territories following the War of 1898 and the subsequent organization 
of local governments for the islands, in an effort to curtail the attempts by 
the residents of the islands to invoke constitutional rights against the Federal 
government, rights that were readily available to the residents of colonial 
territories. Lawmakers invented a new theory of territorial incorporation 
to govern the islands without constitutional restraints. Presumably, 
unincorporated territories were not meant to become a constitutional part 
of the United States until Congress decided to extend this territorial status 
to the islands. During the debates over the Foraker Act of 1900 30, the act 
which organized a local civilian government for Puerto Rico, Senator John C. 
Spooner (R-WI) summarized this logic by arguing that “(t)erritory belonging 
to the United States, as I think Puerto Rico and the Philippine Archipelago 
do, become a part of the United States in the international sense, while not 
being a part of the United States in the constitutional sense” 31. According to 
this logic, Congress could exercise a plenary power to govern the annexed 
territories without constitutional limits.
By 1901, however, the Supreme Court began to affirm a tempered interpretation 
of this logic in a series of rulings known as the Insular Cases by establishing 
that although Congress held a plenary power to govern the territories in a 
different manner than colonial or “incorporated territories”, this power did not 
exist outside of the Constitution. More specifically, the Court established that 
the congressional power to govern the unincorporated territories was limited 
by the “fundamental rights” of the local inhabitants. Stated differently, the 
Court’s interpretation established that the Constitution did not extend on its 
own force or ex propio vigore to the unincorporated territories, but Congress 
had the power to select which constitutional provisions could be extended 
or withheld to an unincorporated territory32. All territories acquired after 1898 
have been governed as unincorporated territories and these precedents have 
been continuously affirmed. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene 
30  Foraker Act of 1900, Chapter 191, 56th Cong., 1st sess. United States Statutes at Large 31 (April 
12, 1900), p. 77.
31  Senator Spooner of Wisconsin, speaking for the Foraker Act of 1900, on April 2, 1900, H.R. 
8245, 56th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 33, part 4: 3629.
32  Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 290-291 (1901).























stands as the latest affirmation of this expansionist tradition, a tradition that 
was originally developed to affirm a U.S. global Empire.
unIncorPorated torture and detentIon camPs
As previously noted, at least two theories have been offered to examine the 
legal and political implications of the camps in Guantánamo Bay. On the 
one hand, Giorgio Agamben has suggested that the camps represent the 
use of a state of exception to legitimate the detention of suspected terrorists. 
Alternatively, Sheldon S. Wolin’s argument suggests that the camps are 
an expression of what he has coined as a form of inverted totalitarianism. 
My contention is that while Agamben’s theory can help us understand the 
underlying ideologies informing the Bush administration’s argument, Wolin’s 
argument better explains the overall ideology used by the United States to 
continue to sustain the torture and detention camps in Guantánamo, an 
ideology that is rooted in the Supreme Court’s rulings tempering the power 
of the Bush administration.
In many ways, the legal story of my argument begins with the Bush 
administration’s efforts to create a “legal black hole” where it could interrogate 
and detain suspected terrorists outside of the scope of the law, both 
constitutional and international. While the Bush administration experimented 
with a host of tactics, including the creation of secret facilities throughout 
the world and the strategic use of planes and ships to continuously navigate 
around the law, it ultimately settled in the creation of camps in Guantánamo 
Bay because the administration’s legal advisors believed that they could make 
a legal argument to legitimate the creation of a camp in an unincorporated 
territory33. Between 2004 and 2008, the Supreme Court tempered this 
interpretation without challenging the ability of the Bush administration to 
maintain camps in Guantánamo, camps that continue to operate almost a 
decade later.
Perhaps seeking to exert a power of judicial review, the Supreme Court began 
to hear cases challenging parts of the Bush administration’s policies in 2004. 
In Rasul the Court began to limit the administration’s policies by ruling the 
policy of preventing detainees from gaining access to federal courts existing 
violated statutory laws. Soon after, a Republican Congress enacted the Detainee 
33  Yoo, John. War by Other Means, An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror, New York, 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006.

















Treatment Act of 2005, which affirmed the Bush administration’s policies by 
amending the relevant statutes. The following year, the Court imposed some 
restrictions on the president’s policies regarding the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus. In Hamdan, however, the Court addressed the failure of the 
president’s policies to comply with United States international obligations, 
international obligations that the U.S. had previously agreed to. That same year, 
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 upholding the policies 
denying detainees the writ to habeas corpus. In 2008, the Court finally turned 
to the Constitution to invalidate the portions of the Military Commissions Act 
preventing detainees from exercising the writ of habeas corpus.
The Bush administration’s policies are best represented in the brief written 
by then Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson on behalf of the United States 
in Rasul. In his brief, Olson relied on a two-prong logic to justify the camps. 
First, he argued that as “enemy combatants”, the detainees were individually 
located outside of the law because they could not claim any rights under any 
nation-state or rather a signatory of an international convention. Citing the 
Insular Cases and subsequent related jurisprudence, the second prong of the 
argument, suggested that the camps located in Guantánamo were no part 
of sovereign United States territory and therefore the detainees lacked the 
necessary constitutional rights to claim access to the courts34. Olson further 
argued that “by its terms, the ICCPR is inapplicable to the conduct by the United 
States outside its sovereign territory”35. In other words, because Guantánamo 
Bay was located outside of the United States it was outside of the purview of the 
constitution, and because international law only applied inside a sovereign’s 
territory, the camps were also outside of the purview of international law. 
While it is true that Olson attempted to further qualify the unincorporated 
status of Guantánamo by arguing that unlike other unincorporated territories, 
this was “leased” rather than annexed, but he still relied on the basic premise 
that unincorporated territories could be selectively governed as foreign in a 
domestic sense36. 
Agamben’s argument suggests that the Bush administration sought to create 
a “zone of indistinction” where the law could be suspended and replaced 
with a normalized military rule. The camp, in Agamben’s view becomes a 
34  Brief for Respondent, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334 and 030434), 14, http://
www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2003/3mer/2mer/2003-0334.mer.aa.html (18.02.2009).
35  Ibid., p. 49.
36  Ibid., p. 44.























space that is constantly negotiating its location inside and outside of the law, 
in doing so it seeks to create “zone of indifference that blurs the boundaries 
of the law37. In the camp, Agamben explains, the law is suspended and does 
not provide the detainee with rights, constitutional or legal. The detainee is 
merely subject to the rule of his or her guards, guards that exercise a form 
of pure power. The detainee is thus subject to the raw power of the military 
guard. In my opinion, this was the goal of the Bush administration’s policies, 
namely to create a space where the military could rule without legal constraints 
on its power. To this extent, Agamben’s analysis captured the logic of the 
Bush administration’s policies.
However, the Supreme Court consistently placed limitations on the ability of 
the Bush administration to exercise its policies without legal constraints. In 
Boumediene the Supreme Court synthesized its position through the affirmation 
of the Insular Cases. More specifically, the a majority of the Court held that 
even enemy combatants held in Guantánamo were entitled to “fundamental 
rights” and protections such as the writ of habeas corpus. Writing for the 
majority in Boumediene, Justice Anthony Kennedy argued:
Yet the government’s view is that the Constitution had no effect there, at 
least to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed sovereignty in 
the formal sense of the term. The necessary implication of the argument 
is that by surrendering formal sovereignty over any unincorporated 
territory to a third party, while at the same time entering into a lease 
that grants total control over the territory back to the United States, 
it would be possible for the political branches to govern without legal 
constraints.
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution 
grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, 
and govern territory, not the power to decide when and were its terms 
apply. Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers 
are not “absolute and unlimited” but are subject “to such restrictions 
as are expressed in the Constitution” 38.
While it is possible to argue that the Court was merely using this interpretation 
to retain the power of judicial review, a power that would have been denied in 
37  Agamben, The State of Exception, op. cit., p. 23.
38  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2258-2259.

















a place where the Constitution is inoperative, it is also important to note that 
the Court used the recognition of the writ of habeas corpus to place limitations 
on the power of the administration. Yet, while the a slight majority of the 
Court was consistently willing to curtail the efforts of the Bush administration 
to claim “absolute and unlimited” powers, it was unwilling to declare the 
torture and detention camps altogether unconstitutional. Here the Court was 
provided with an opportunity to revoke a century-old set of expansionist 
legal precedents, and the justices rather affirmed the continued legitimacy of 
the Insular Cases.
It is this failure to challenge the legitimacy of torture and detention camps in 
the first place that illustrates how the law is employed to maintain its violent 
power over Guantánamo and other unincorporated territories, a power that 
is reminiscent of what Wolin describes as a form of inverted totalitarianism. 
For Wolin, the genius of inverted totalitarianism lies in its ability to create a 
totalizing system, while simultaneously appearing to promote the rule of law 
and democracy39. The notion of inverted totalitarianism explains how the 
U.S. can continue to maintain torture and detention camps while granting 
“fundamental” constitutional rights and protections. It is the power to reconcile 
the principle that the United States stands for limited powers and democracy 
under a totalitarian system that enables the military to continue to torture and 
detain suspected terrorists in an unincorporated territory40. 
My point is to suggest that the Supreme Court, like other branches of 
government, is complicity in affirming a totalitarian system while simultaneously 
claiming to grant due process rights and privileges to those who are subject 
to this violence. More importantly, the legal foundations of this interpretation 
are rooted in longstanding precedents that date back for more than a century. 
In addition, this is a legal logic that both claims to uphold a constitutional 
myth of limited government and democracy, while perpetuating a totalitarian 
system of detention. To this extent, Wolin’s analysis offers a clearer perception 
of the ways that the U.S. government employs the use of camps to exercise 
its power, a power that that in my opinion emphasizes might and fear over 
justice and democracy.
39  Wolin, Democracy Incorporated, op. cit., p. 57.
40  Ibid., p. 286-287.
























This article affirms two interpretations that are central to understanding the 
how the United States has used the law to affirm its power to create torture 
and detention camps in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. First, I argue that the legal 
basis for the creation of the camps in an unincorporated territory is not new 
and has been part of a century-old tradition of U.S. global expansionism. This 
tradition relied on a particular territorial law and policy that both departed 
from prior colonialist and imperialist territorial precedents, and simultaneously 
combined features from both traditions. My point is to establish that the legal 
logic of the torture and detention camps created in Guantánamo Bay was an 
continued expression of a legal logic used to govern unincorporated territories 
like Puerto Rico. There is little if anything that is new or innovative about the 
legal arguments used by the United States government to continue to affirm 
its exercise of violence over those unfortunate enough to fall prey to United 
States officials enforcing the related anti-terrorism policies.
As I have also noted above, my contention is that the Supreme Court’s 
interventions to temper the Bush administration’s policies towards Guantánamo 
were reproduced a form of inverted totalitarianism. Rather than creating a state 
of exception, a goal of the Bush administration as Agamben rightly notes, 
the U.S. government collectively relied on the use of legal precedents that 
affirmed the continuation of torture and detention camps while maintaining 
claiming to uphold the principles of limited government and democratic rule. 
Here lies the power of inverted totalitarianism.
Wolin’s argument further suggests that the system of inverted totalitarianism, 
unlike the traditional totalitarian tradition, is not premised on the rule or cult 
of a personality, but rather it operates independently of leaders41. Wolin’s 
argument suggests that President Obama, who has embraced more moderate 
and just positions, is subject to the power of inverted totalitarianism. To this 
extent, his failure to close Guantánamo Bay merely confirms the incredible 
power of this ideological apparatus, an apparatus that is beyond the control 
of mere presidents and leaders. Not only has President Obama refused to 
exercise his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief to close the torture 
and detention camps in Guantánamo, but he has refused repudiate the 
underlying legal interpretations that sustain the camps. President Obama, 
like his predecessor, has become a subject and enforcer of a form of inverted 
totalitarianism.
41  Ibid., p. 44.


















Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception, Trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago, The University 
of Chicago Press, 2005.
Cole, David. Enemy Aliens, Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in 
the War on Terrorism, New York, The New Press, 2003.
Congressional Research Service. Admission of States Into the Union After the 
Original Thirteen: A Brief History and Analysis of the Statehood Process, 
prepared by Peter B. Sheridan, Government Division, Congressional 
Research Service, 85-765 GOV, Washington, D.C., 1985.
Dorf, Michael C. “What’s at Stake in the Latest Guantánamo Bay Case?”, 
en Findlaw.com, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20071205.html 
(16.02.2009).
Duffy Burnett, Christina and Burke Marshall, eds. Foreign in a Domestic Sense: 
Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2001.
Duffy Burnett, Christina. “A Convenient Constitution? Constitutionality After 
Boumediene v. Bush”, Columbia Law Review, No. 109 (2009), pp. 973-
1046.
Farrand, Max. The Legislation of Congress for the Government of the Organized 
Territories of the United States, 1789-1895, Newark: Ed. Wm. A. Baker, 
1896.
Farrand, Max. “Territory and District”, in The American Historical Review, 5, no. 
4 1900, 676-681.
Grupo de Investigadores Puertorriqueños. Breakthrough From Colonialism: 
An Interdisciplinary Study of Statehood, 2 vols. Río Piedras: Ed. de la 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1984.
LaFeber, Walter. “The ‘Lion in the Path’: The U.S. Emergence as a World Power”, 
en Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no. 5, 1986, 705-718.
López Baralt, José. The Policy of the United States Towards its Territories with 
Special Reference to Puerto Rico, Río Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, 1999.
Mahan, A. T. The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future, Boston, 
Little, Brown and Company, 1898.























Margulies, Joseph. Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power, New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 2006.
Mayer, Jane. The Dark Side, The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned 
into a War on American Ideals, New York, Doubleday, 2008.
Neuman, Gerald L. “The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush”, 
Southern California Law Review, No. 82 (2009), pp. 259-260.
Rivera Ramos, Efrén. American Colonialism in Puerto Rico: The Judicial and 
Social Legacy, Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007.
Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge. Strategy as Politics: Puerto Rico on the Eve of the Second 
World War. Río Piedras, La Editorial, 2007.
Schmitt, Carl. The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Trans. Ellen Kennedy, 
Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1988.
Sparrow, Bartholomew H. The Insular Cases and the Emergence of the American 
Empire, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.
Torruella, Juan R. The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico, The Doctrine of Separate 
and Unequal, Río Piedras: Ed. de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1988.
Trinklein, Michael J. Lost States, True Stories of Texlahoma, Transylvania, and 
Other States That Never Made It, Philadelphia: Quirk Books, 2010.
United States Congress. Revised Statutes of the United States, 1873-1874, 43rd Cong., 
1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878.
Willoughby, William F. Territories and Dependencies of the United States, Their 
Government and Administration, New York: The Century Co., 1905.
Wolin, Sheldon S. Democracy Incorporated, Managed Democracy and the Specter 
of Inverted Totalitarianism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008.
Yoo, John. War by Other Means, An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror, New 
York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006.
